NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES FOR REHEARING
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
STATE OF
Appellant,
Appeal No. CRC 07-41 APANO
UCN522007AP000041XXXXCR
v.
JASON NOSAL
Appellee.
__________________________/
Opinion filed _________________.
Appeal from a decision entered by
the
County Judge John D. Carballo
Sarah Jonovich, Esquire
Assistant State Attorney
J. Kevin Hayslett, Esquire
Attorney for appellee
ORDER AND OPINION
(J. Demers)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the State’s appeal from an order entered by the Pinellas County Court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a blood test. After reviewing the briefs and record, this Court reverses the decision and remands for further proceedings.
Facts
The police received a call from a resident who claimed that another person in a vehicle had followed her home and was parked in her driveway. The police arrived at the location and found the defendant in the driver’s seat of the vehicle parked in the driveway with the engine running. He appeared to be either passed out or sleeping.
The officers were concerned because the defendant did not respond to knocking on the window and, despite the vehicle being parked on the steep driveway, the emergency brake was disengaged; so they opened the driver’s door. A strong odor of alcohol came from the vehicle. The police observed a wet spot on the defendant’s pants and smelled the odor of urine; it appeared that the defendant had wet himself. The police attempted to awaken the defendant and engaged the emergency brake. The defendant, however, attempted to drive the vehicle and disengaged the emergency brake. This caused the vehicle to roll backwards down the steep driveway and pinned the officers between the car door and the vehicle.
The officers again attempted to get the defendant out of the vehicle, but he again started to drive. Because of the defendant’s inability or refusal to cooperate he was tasered. The defendant continued to resist and was again tasered. Paramedics were called to the scene --- pursuant to standard procedures whenever a person is tasered. The paramedics recommended that the defendant go to the hospital because he had an elevated heart rate that did not subside. At first, the defendant refused medical treatment. The officers were concerned the defendant may have had excited delirium, a possible consequence of someone being tasered. One of the officers told the defendant that he could go to the hospital, take a blood test, and go home pending the results of the test; or, if he refused medical treatment, he would be taken to the jail. The officer also told the defendant --- who was a fellow police officer in a nearby jurisdiction ---- that he might face media attention if he were taken to jail. The defendant was persuaded to go to the hospital.
While at the hospital an officer believed that the defendant would be admitted; therefore, he determined that the taking of a breath test would be impractical at the time because there was no breathalyzer at the hospital. The officer then asked the defendant to take a blood test, and the defendant submitted. The defendant sought to suppress the results of the blood test. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State is appealing that order.
Consent to blood test is not the initial inquiry
The trial court relied upon Vaughn
v. State, 13
In Vaughn, the defendant was involved in an accident. When the police arrived, he admitted to driving, and he showed signs of impairment. He was taken to the hospital for treatment of injuries to his face. A deputy determined that it was impractical to take a breath test, and the defendant submitted to a blood test. The defendant sought to have the results suppressed because he claimed he only submitted to the blood test because the deputy told him that if he did not take the blood test he would be arrested, and therefore, his submission to the blood test was involuntary. The appellate court rejected his argument because whether or not the blood draw was voluntary was not the issue. If the blood test was properly administered pursuant to the implied consent law, then the voluntariness of the consent is not an issue.
The court noted that in Slaney v. State, 653 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) the appellate court ruled that voluntary consent is only important when the blood test is not authorized by the implied consent law. Thus, it was premature for the trial court to consider the voluntary consent issue.[1] The State need rely on the defendant’s alleged voluntary consent to take the blood test only if it fails to establish that the blood test was taken in compliance with the implied consent law.
Compliance with implied consent is the issue
In the case at bar, the focus should
not have been on voluntary consent. If, pursuant to the implied consent law,
the police had reasonable cause to believe the defendant was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages, that the defendant appeared for treatment at a hospital,
and that the police reasonably determined that the administration of a breath
test within a reasonable time was impractical or impossible, the results of the
blood test are admissible. See §316.1932(1)(c),
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this Court reverses the order suppressing the results of the blood test, and remands this case to the trial court so that the court may determine whether or not the results of the blood test should come in via the implied consent law.
DONE AND ORDERED in
_____________________________
Joseph A. Bulone
Circuit Court Judge
_____________________________
David A. Demers
Circuit Court Judge
______________________________
Cynthia J. Newton
Circuit Court Judge
cc: Office of the State Attorney
Honorable John D. Carballo
J. Kevin Hayslett, Esquire
[1] This Court does not reach the issue of whether or not the consent to take the blood test was voluntary, and it takes no position at this time on the issue.